Safety-car and Refueling. Poor imitation

1973 Canadian Grand Prix at Mosport. 1st Pace-car appearance in Formula 1

  The Safety Car appeared for the first time in F1 in 1973, during the Canadian Grand Prix at Mosport. At that time, the organization of the Grand Prix was not as rigorous and standardized as today, whether in terms of safety or otherwise. Each organizer did his own thing. Following an accident involving François Cevert, the "pace car", as it is called in North America, intervened by jumping in front of the second driver rather than the leader, disrupting the lap by lap and making the classification confusing, sowing doubt about the latter for a long time. The experience had scalded everyone.

Subsequently, we never saw a safety car neutralize a race again (outside America) until the early 1990s, while the 24 Hours of Le Mans had already been using the pace car since the 1930s, before adopting the safety-ar in 1981. It was only from 1993 that the Safety-car was officially introduced, first in F1 before becoming widespread in other non-American automobile disciplines.

1993 Brazilian Grand Prix at Interlagos. Laps under Safety car under rainy conditions

  On the other hand, Refueling has been commonplace in Grand Prix since the latter existed, except when it was not necessary during periods when, with small and less thirsty engines, shorter races and more resistant tires than modern slicks, teams saw no benefit in saving a few Kg of fuel between stops. The few seconds gained by lightening the F1 cars during each stint did not justify wasting a lot of time in the pits to refuel and change tires. Work on the cars was much slower then than it later became when refueling was reintroduced in 1982 by the Brabham engineer Gordon Murray. 

But with FISA's desire to control the escalation in power of turbo engines in F1 in the mid-1980s, the simplest and most effective solution to achieve this was to reduce consumption, which implied ban refueling, starting in 1984.

However, these two elements, the “Safety Car” and refueling, would return in F1 from 1993.

Refueling during a pre-war era Grabd Prix. Mercedes

Why did this happened?

- The context: 

  At the beginning of the 90s, after the ban on turbos, F1 experienced a major technological leap, first with the introduction of the semi-automatic transmission, then this accelerated with the active suspension (which allowed the Williams-Renault team to dominate the competition), synthetic fuels, fly-by-wire controls, traction control, four wheel steering... but these spectacular advances ended up harming the show. Only the richest teams could afford to develop these technologies, crushing other teams and making races more or less predictable. At the same time, it was the time when Eurosport channel began to broadcast the american CART championship by satellite, in Europe in particular, which allowed the European public to get an idea of the quality of the show on the other side of the the Atlantic and therefore could not help comparing it to F1.

Nigel Mansell switched from F1 to Indycar in 1993

  To drive the point home, following a season dominated by his Williams-Renault where he won the world champion title in the summer, Nigel Mansell was nevertheless unable to renew his contract with his boss Frank Williams under the conditions that he considered it consistent with his new status. Hurt in his self-esteem, he preferred to emigrate to the USA to race in Indy as several other ex-F1 drivers before him did with great success.

His thunderous and victorious debut in this championship in 1993 propelled the CART audience in Europe to a level threatening the popularity of Formula 1. It was at this moment that Bernie Ecclestone, then F1 big boss, sensed the danger and decided to act in collaboration with the new president of the FIA, his friend Max Mosley to counter the American offensive.

It was obvious that Indycar was a well-established spectacle and above all well mastered, and that F1, due to its cosmopolitan, open character and increasingly dependent on large automobile companies, willingly sacrificed spectacle and sporting balance in the name of victory at all costs and technological excellence of which F1 considered itself to be the supreme and exclusive showcase.

To match the INDY, if not surpass it in the eyes of F1 fans who were also gradually taking the path followed by Nigel Mansell, the FIA chose the simplest solution: Imitate CART.

Starting by banning all the latest technical innovations and driving aids (with the exception of the semi-automatic transmission which was very advantageous in terms of reliability, and therefore costs).

Then, it was the return to refueling banned since 1984, which were a spectacle in themselves in America, where they help to spice up the races and shake up the rankings to the delight of American spectators eager for Hollywood-style twists and turns. , however artificial it may be.

Ayrton Senna on his Williams-Renault during a pitstop. 1994

 Together with refuelling, another major innovation inspired by the USA was introduced: the safety-car, just like the American pace car.

These radical and hasty changes naturally required time to adapt. This was not without missteps, and sometimes even dramas (more or less serious accidents and fires in the pits during refueling and tire changes...), although the effect on the show could be felt, even if this was largely outweighed by several factors.

Dangers of refueling during race. Hockenheim 1994. German Grand Prix

  Indeed, these modifications had arrived at a time when a usually outsider team, Benetton, was beginning not only to seriously threaten the domination of Williams-Renault, but also to dominate the series, in part thanks to its extremely talented and ambitious driver, Michael Schumacher, to his engineers...and also thanks to a somewhat free interpretation of the regulations probably encouraged by the rather cavalier boss of this team, Flavio Briaore. A new era of domination was to be feared to the point that the FIA had to intervene on several occasions to put a spoke in the wheels of these new scarecrows in order, among other things, to maintain interest in the championship.

 Finally, over time, refueling and the safety car definitively became part of the customs of F1. But refueling had become so controlled that it made the races largely predictable, to the point that overtaking (if we can call it that) was done much more in the pits, namely during refueling stops and tire changes, than on the track. This often ends up giving rise to high speed processions, notably on certain circuits like Barcelona (which the teams know so well from running there during the off-season and during private tests, to the point that spanish or Catalunya Grand Prix are regulated like a routine flight plan with almost no risk taking on track or surprises).

F1 refueling Pit stops good for sponsors ?... really ? 

 Worse still, following a typically European and elitist trend of seeking absolute performance and perfectionism, pit stops in F1 had become so perfect to a point their duration was reduced to such an extent that the spectator could see nothing more than an ultra-fast and precise mechanical ballet, which repeated without improvisation or imponderables - with rare exceptions - ended up becoming commonplace.

 Part of the effect originally sought (spectacular and unpredictable refueling) was no longer there. The irony is that this ended up harming overtaking which became more rare. Almost everything now came down to stopping strategies. Strategies that are predictable and often known to everyone! Because in the era of easy access to information, thanks to new media and information technologies which provided Grand Prix commentators with a wealth of live detailed information on the racing strategies of each team, even before race starts, the public could no longer be surprised by unforeseen events. Spectators and commentators ended up wishisng each time that the rain would come and mingle with the show, just to spice it up and redistribute the cards. 

Praying for rain during a Grand Prix has become quite common

  In dry conditions, drivers talent became secondary, it was the entire team that decided the result. Certainly this has always been the case in motorsport, but in general, the work of the team was made before the race, whereas during it, it was on the shoulders of the driver that the race rested largely. That was at least the case for Grand Prix racing, unlike endurance, for example. 

The permanent radio contact ended up driving the point home to the point that the engineer can now dictate almost every action to the driver, leaving him little room for improvisation.

- Why didn't it work as planned?

In fact, in its desire to imitate CART, F1 tried to adapt American solutions to its sauce. This ended up giving the opposite result to that sought. If copying was necessary, it would have been better to do it intelligently. In Indy or NASCAR for example, the number of mechanics intervening during stops is limited, therefore the intervention is longer, giving rise to more possibilities of errors, hesitations and other unforeseen events in addition to making the pit stop visually telegenic. In F1, the camera can barely capture a piece of the car because there are so many mechanics around it! We also see the Indy or NASCAR driver making signs and talking to his team, communicating... in short, it's more interesting and more... human. Sometimes even funny... :)

Nothing as spectacular as NASCAR refueling stops !

Ultimately, these refuelings were banned from F1 again after less than two decades when it was realized that they had a large part of the responsibility for the poor spectacle that F1 had achieved. The official excuse was safety and cost... well costs in terms of spectators lost in favor of INDY probably...

For the safety car, then, the problem was not to copy the Americans badly, but rather to have copied them altogether.

In the USA, the conception of a sporting event is different from the rest of the world. Americans love interruptions during a game, and some of the specifically American sports are characterized by these very frequent pauses. We see it in Baseball, Ice Hockey, American Football... and also in car racing, especially in the most popular categories. Interruptions are an element of american culture and media, fundamentally motivated by an economic objective dear to uninhibited and aggressive capitalism: to be able to insert as many advertisements as possible and encourage spectators to consume beers and other popcorn and chips or coke cans during the neutralizations.

  As a result, the interventions of the pace car are a godsend for the sponsors and indirectly for the organizers and participants who recognize the merit of indirectly filling their bank accounts. The pace car also has a safety advantage, but specific to racing on ovals. 

Racing on an oval circuit is precisely a question of rhythm (hence "pace" in pace-car). The cars drive on ovals at a sustained and very fast pace. All just a few centimeters from a threatening concrete wall. Breaking this pace with simple yellow flags at the accident site would be dangerous. You do not brake on an oval without risking causing a pile-up because on this type of circuit you rarely and briefly touch the brakes, this requires great concentration and a lot of finesse and anticipation to avoid making any movement abrupt, especially since a turn passes quickly. This means that after an accident, it is out of question to simply slow down the accident zone with yellow flags. This would introduce a certain danger zone where cars would be forced to brake and then restart afterwards, thus introducing chaos into the rhythm of the field, especially given the lap times, and distances required for slowing down and restarting on such circuits (most of which are very short), the momentum will be broken for at least half of the lap disrupting the race in any case.

The inimitable NASCAR show !

  Finally, on an oval, there is practically no respite time allowing emergency services to intervene, the cars pass constantly given their often high number compared to the distance of the circuit, and because of the very short lap times, not to mention the fact that overtaking outside the yellow flag zone during intervention would be too dangerous since these overtaking maneuvers also require a preparation time and distance which can sometimes take an entire lap given the speeds reached and the short lenghts of the circuits. 

One of the 1st pace-car appearances in racing History

  So, the idea emerged of introducing the pace-car to contain the cars during the race, a pace-car which was already used for flying starts in Indianapolis, but for this time to dictate a regular rhythm to the entire peloton in the event of an accident and not only before the start during the warm-up or parade laps.

Afterwards, it was a matter of tradition that the pace car was extended to racing on American road circuits. But there was also another reason for this which had already proven itself...

 As luck would have it, it very quickly turned out that aggregating a stretched peloton was the best way to restart a long NASCAR or Indycar race which was getting bogged down in monotony and possibly break the dominance of certain competitors. This could only please a North American audience too accustomed to last-minute tricks and twists like in Hollywood films. The average American spectator has no problem with artifice (as in all areas of his daily life), as long as it gives him his dose of adrenaline, even if it is to the detriment of the credibility of a scenario or sporting fairness. The participants, for their part, have been used to it for generations and never think to question this situation, however unfair it may be, especially since it also has a significant economic advantage as specified above.

  Finally, the interests at stake in an American race are not as important as in an F1 GP, and the manufacturers are aware that this is part of the the game and that it pleases their public. Moreover, if no competitor dominates the others, precisely thanks to this system, then almost everyone can win one day or another. Perhaps they have also understood for a long time that winning all the time is not necessarily a good thing for a company's brand image. They are the kings of marketing after all...

- What about the European copy of the Pace car?

   As we have seen, the safety goal of this process is fully justified on an oval, and its extension to American road circuits was certainly a question of habit and the search for spectacle at all costs so dear to the Americans as well as a guarantee of additional money coming in which was very pleasing to the various sponsors and therefore to all those involved in these championships. 

 The argument of artifice in the service of show was probably the main motivation of Bernie Ecclestone and the FIA to save F1 from the monotony which threatened it at the time of the domination of Williams-Renault. But with the big industrial stakes in F1, this new measure was not popular among top teams, which did not prevent the most influential members of FOCA from accepting it reluctantly, also aware of the threats weighing on their sport which required a rapid reaction.

 The public also had difficulty accepting this change which distorted the sport in their eyes. The worst case scenario occurred when a race ended under a yellow flag. The spectators largely prefer the case of a race being stopped and amputated for example of its last 5 or 10 laps rather than seeing the latter accomplished behind the safety car, or to see the latter disappear before the last lap to restart a race which would be played entirely on a single lap or turn, perhaps distorting the result and possibly allowing the least deserving to win thanks to a daring overtake or an unfair hazard or strategy improvisation. We saw the controversy that such a situation caused at the end of the 2021 Formula 1 season in Abu-Dhabi.

One of the most controversial Safety car interventions in F1 at 2021 Abu Dhabi GP. It played a key role in the championship result that year.

  The worst was when the SC became generalized to other races with a shorter format. Imagine the frustration of a spectator who buys his ticket expensively and also travels hundreds of km to attend an FIA race lasting 20 or 30 minutes per round and who sees the last half (10 or 15 minutes) completely neutralized under safety car. Even worst: the same thing could be repeated in the 2nd round if the circuit lends itself too much to crashes and pile-ups like some city tracks, or in the event of capricious weather! 

Unfortunately, this has already happened several times, like in WTCC. We haven't seen anything more insulting to the public (apart from the 2005 Indianapolis F1 GP of course).

  The safety argument does not hold water on a road circuit, especially since the lap times are quite long and the pelotons are thin (as is most often the case in several championships to whom this imported process is imposed). In those cases emergency services can intervene in complete safety while being sufficiently protected by yellow flags. For more safety, officials could even show these flags 400 meters before the yellow flags zone and some 300m after for example to avoid the slightest risk. Strict respect for these flags should be sufficient.

 There remains the risk of lack of visibility in the event of rain, threatening marshals and drivers safety in yellow flag areas, like what caused the fatal accident of Jules Bianchi. It is clear that in such conditions, neither yellow flags nor even the safety car are sufficient. Interrupting the race immediately is the only thing to do, even if it means restarting it later.

  But as we know, considerations other than the participants and rescuers safety push some organizers to favor interests and firmly locked contracts (in the case of televised races).

  In other cases, such as when the safety car intervenes at the 24 Hours of Le Mans for a very localized accident while the circuit is more than 13 km long, this remains inexplicable if not purely a phenomenon of mimicry which is reinforced with time, or by the fear of being reproached for not having blindly applied this safety rule in the event of an unlikely serious accident occurring in the yellow flags zone... unless it is a pretext to restart a long soporific race. Fortunately, this is not systematically the case for the slightest accident occurring during another big endurance race, the 24 Hours of the Nürburgring! In that race at least, common sense is preserved despite the dangerousness of the track.

  The security argument to defend the safety-car is therefore rarely credible. Not surprising. As we have seen, the primary reason for its introduction was completely different... always the same... "Follow the money"!

Jump start: Was it allowed ?

 For those not so young who are watching Grand Prix videos from the 70s or early 80s for the first time, it is always surprising to see that slight jump starts were more or less tolerated. It doesn't look serious, especially in the context of a Formula 1 GP.

1973 German Grand Prix 

  This phenomenon could be partly explained by the difficulty of slipping the clutch of an F1 car with phenomenal torque and a power of more than 400 HP without any driving assistance such as traction control. The drivers, forced to slip their clutch in order not to miss the start - no clutch being able to withstand this power for long - sometimes it was extremely difficult to keep the car from moving any longer, thereby moving forward a meter or two. This explains why the driver, to avoid an obvious false start, sometimes released his foot from the accelerator and re-disengaged at the very moment the flag was lowering, causing him to miss his momentum.

To complicate matters, during the 1970s, standing start procedures did not follow strict protocol. Each race director had his own way of giving the signal, which could change at any time. Some starters even took great pleasure in playing on the drivers' nerves by moving their arm without lowering the flag during the last 10 or 15 seconds during which it was agreed that they would give the signal.

We must also not forget that the starting grids varied from one circuit to another, particularly at the time of transition between the 3-2-3 grids and the more staggered even grids which still exist today. There were also circuits where the starting straight was more or less sloping like at Brands-Hatch.

 

British GP at Brands Hatch. Watch the start ! 

They were so tolerant back then about this that it often happened that drivers positioned themselves in front of their assigned position on the grid to be at the exact height of the driver supposed to be in front of them on the line, while in other occasions they remained at the very back. In this case, the trick was to release the clutch a little, a second or two before the signal, so as to arrive at their starting location right at the moment of the flag dropping, which meant that technically they were not stealing the start. The main advantage being to avoid slipping the clutch for too long and, better still, to find oneself in a flying start at the moment of the signal, which was clearly advantageous compared to those who made a real standing start.

In the video below from the 1974 Spanish Grand Prix, we can see a typical start from the 70s. In fact, it's almost a caricature of the starts of the time, the worst example I've personally seen. 

1974 Spanish Grand Prix. What a mess at the start !

   It is obvious that giving a new start in car racing for each false start is far from being as simple as in athletics. That was motivated by many reasons: the need to refuel on the grid in the event that refueling is prohibited during the race and, especially knowing many were too short on fuel for weight reasons, and the risk involved in multiplying starts (the most dangerous moment of the race) with the costs and the additional workload that this would imply for the teams and mechanics in the event of pileups, as well as the risk that this eliminates several competitors, particularly the most important ones from the start of the race, the time constraints of television in the case of races transmitted live, given the time it takes to restart the entire procedure, the obligation to carry out a new warm-up lap in addition if the interruption lasts too long or if the weather conditions change, and above all the additional constraints to be subjected to the clutches and transmissions, to name just a few reasons... in short, there was no shortage of reasons to tolerate barely stolen starts.

Certainly, one could object that time penalties were possible and even actually applied against offenders in the event of an early departure in a too conspicuous manner, particularly on the part of the leaders, but abuse this penalty for the slightest early departure or a few meters gained at low speed on the grid would have been abusive and above all would have complicated the race for the spectators and the teams that would be obliged to take into account the penalty in question, thus distorting the spectacle.

But over time, the technology and the departure procedure have evolved so much that these problems are now a thing of the past. Like all progress, it happened gradually.

The tragedy of 1978 Italian F1 GP start

  Playing with the tolerance of race directors or taking advantage of their dilettantism or incompetence ended up no longer being tolerated, especially after the drama of the Italian Grand Prix at Monza in 1978 which caused the death of Ronnie Peterson, after the starter gave the signal before the last ones had all stopped, thereby creating a traffic jam before the first chicane with cars arriving at high speed and the first having taken a standing start (well... almost).The difference in speed and the particularity of the track which narrows at the approach of the first chicane having led to the drama that we know. This is why we see a marshal wave a green flag behind at the back of the starting grid once he is certain that all the competitors have stopped, thus signaling to the race director that he can finally give the signal.

  That particular race was also one of the rare ones in that era where some drivers have been penalized for stealing the start. It was actually at the restart after Ronnie Peterson's accident, when the leaders, Gilles Villeneuve and Mario Andretti were given a minute penalty each for starting a few tenths before the signal.

Senna, Prost, Schumacher, Hamilton, Fangio: No one is the Greatest !

  Heated discussions over who is the "greatest" driver of all time are very common, particularly among younger F1 fans, and can occasionally result in tense confrontations on social media. The growing amount of F1 coverage in the media has increased the frequency and polarization of this topic.

But does this debate at least make sense when it comes to Formula 1, or is it inane and unresolvable ?

Senna, Prost, Piquet and Mansell. The giants quartet of the 80s

  Since motorsport is primarily a machine sport, it is important to keep in mind that engineers, mechanics, and other team members are responsible for the development and preparation of these vehicles; the driver is merely the final link in a lengthy chain. In the context of a car competition, it is very complicated to weigh up the respective merits of each person in the final result of a car. Focusing on the driver is so frustrating and unfair to everyone who works behind the scenes and in the pits to put a high-performance winning machine in the hands of the driver.

"Gang of Four" T-Shirt. 

Senna, Prost, Mansell, Piquet

  One just have to remember how many dominant drivers during a season have found themselves overnight in the middle or at the back of the pack due to the equipment, to realize that the share of engineers and teams is much higher and more decisive than that of the drivers. A deep look at behind-the-scenes of teams, the secrets of their best cars, the engineering tricks which gave them a certain advantage at a given moment will make any virtual drivers hierarchy useless. Despite the fact that this observation seems obvious, a lot of fans choose to ignore it or forget it because they are so enthralled with the drivers they admire. 

Lewis Hamilton. One of the all-greats 

  Comparing drivers respective merits is a complicated exercise. Unlike other sports, it is difficult to judge driving qualities by observing the gestures of a racing driver as one does for a football player or a gymnast. Including in single-seaters (not to mention the fact that we never see drivers' feet anyway). We cannot judge a driver's style based solely on the behavior of the car, the latter depends on other parameters than that induced by driving alone.

On the other hand, as explained above, it is completely misleading to base yourself on the performance of a car to pass judgment on its driver, the latter being only a variable which comes after many others, mechanical, more important.

Gilles Villeneuve. Another spectacular driver who never become an F1 champion. Did he have what it took to become one? 

  Another specific parameter to motor sports which makes comparison between drivers almost impossible is the difference between eras. Comparing F1 drivers from the 50s or 60s to those of the 80s or 90s is already absurd in itself, because the changes between periods are so significant. So establishing a hierarchy including Fangio and Schumacher is even more absurd. In fact, there are much more differences between F1 of the 70s and the 90s or 2000s than between F1 and Indycars of a same decade. We can even say that we are talking about different categories when we compare different periods of the same formula. Because everything has changed: the cars, the races, the technical framework and the financial context, the media environnement, the circuits, the number of races, their duration, the purely physical constraints, safety, mentality... 

  On the other hand, the qualifier "Best" is often an empty word if we want to give it an absolute meaning. This especially means nothing in the context of a sport that is so sophisticated and made up of an interaction of multiple parameters making value judgments ineffective.

We can analyze the intrinsic qualities of a driver, if we know him well (very difficult for a spectator, even an informed one). For this, it would be necessary to have on hand a lot of information and technical testimonies from his engineers and close collaborators to be able to draw a full picture, in addition to direct observation on the track, all over a long period, allowing to compare his performance on several cars in order to have elements of comparison and also an idea of his evolution.

When we take part in this exercise we realize that the value judgment is meaningless and that each driver has his own qualities and style which make him unique. Likewise, we realize that this style and these qualities depend on the cars he drives, which may or may not suit him, on the settings, on his collaboration with his engineers, on his qualities as a developer and improviser, on his ability to adapt to these elements which never stop changing, to one's own evolution over the course of a career, etc...

Piquet, Mansell and senna on the German Grand Prix podium.

It's rare to witness 3 or 4 F1 giants competing against each other for a long time during the same era.

  What would be fair and objective is to identify the qualities of a driver compared to his contemporaries competing in the same discipline, by establishing several hierarchies each based on a distinct parameter. Example: The fastest driver on a lap; The most reliable; The most reckless; The most ambitious; The most aggressive; The most spectacular; The most calculating; The best strategist; The most homogeneous; The most versatile...

Just by establishing this list, names of drivers come spontaneously to mind, but we must be careful not to compare eras that are too distant. Certain relatively close eras can be just as incomparable because they have undergone radical changes from one to the other.

For example, let's take 80s Formula 1:

- Fastest on one lap: Senna

- The most reliable: Lauda and Prost

- The most reckless: Villeneuve, Senna and Mansell

- Most ambitious: Senna

- Most aggressive: Senna and Mansell

- The most spectacular: Villeneuve, Mansell and Senna

- The most calculating: Piquet, Lauda and Prost

- Smoothest style: Prost

- The best strategist: Lauda and Prost

- The most homogeneous: Prost

- Best at setting-up the car: Prost

- The most versatile (for this specific criterion, we can obviously take into account all categories and eras combined): Ickx, Andretti, Schlesser and Fittipaldi

  A clear-cut debate about who is the "best" racing driver of all time or even just his generation is not nearly as fascinating or fruitful as a comparative study of the attributes of drivers using such exact and definite criteria.

In fact, motorsport is so diverse and compartmentalized that each discipline is unique, most often with its specialists that even world champions from other more prestigious formulas, would have difficulty challenging on their playground. How many times have we seen F1 world champions, despite their adaptability and experience, struggle to beat young karting drivers when they took the wheel again in some kart events.

In fact, there is no one motorsport, but several. It is hardly an exaggeration to think that the various categories of motor racing are as close to each other as football is to handball or basketball.

Safety escalation in motorsport. An hypocrisy ?

    The problem of racing drivers' heads vulnerability has been around for a very long time. After the deaths of Ayrton Senna and Roland Ratzenberger in 1994, the FIA imposed side protection around the cockpits. Nothing more had been done in this area for a long time despite the occurrence of several serious incidents affecting this critical part of the drivers' anatomy, apart from the introduction of the HANS system. It was not until the accidents which cost the lives of Jules Bianchi at the Japanese Grand Prix and Henry Surtees in Formula 2 that the subject was raised again.

The Formula One Halo 

   The choice of the halo for F1 and then its generalization to other categories of modern formula cars was imposed after several tests and discussions which sparked lively controversies between security "progressives" and purists. In the USA, the same problem arose after several serious accidents where drivers were hit in the head. But the Americans' choice ultimately fell on the Aeroscreen, a sort of windshield leaving an opening at the top to allow the driver to get out (shall we conclude that closed racing cars like prototypes and hypercars are dangerous and must now be opened to facilitate the exit of the driver in the event of an accident where the doors are blocked? well, we know that the constraints are not the same, the structural requirements of a single-seater are different from the characteristics of wider and more heavy race cars, and what poses a problem in single-seaters is not really a problem elsewhere... but can we ignore the fact that getting out a driver from a closed race car after a crash has proved many times to be problematic? what is tolerated in GT or Touring racing is apparently not in single-seaters...).

The indy car Aeroscreen

   However, many fans believe that the "halo" distorts the aesthetics of the single-seaters and would limit the visibility of the drivers, which they believe could harm their safety. This last argument was quickly brushed aside by a number of drivers themselves, most of whom have sincerely (or out of professional obligation?) recognized that it only requires a short time of adaptation and that afterward it is hardly noticed. If they say it, we can only believe them. After all, they are capable of racing in torrential rain with near-zero visibility if their contract requires them to do so. And it is difficult to see them collectively accepting a measure that would clearly call their security into question.

The Halo played its role many times, no doubt. But...

  As for the other argument of the opponents of this system, aesthetics, it is defendable even if one can object that in this case, it is the public which quickly gets used to it, as with everything else. We must also recognize that aesthetically, the designers have done a very good job of integration to the point that modern F1 cars (and I'm only talking about F1 cars) still remain quite beautiful with the halo, which is less the case with Formula 4 cars for example (but who cares about F4 look after all?). Better anyway than the Indy Cars whose shape of the Aeroscreen breaks the line of the car with their flared look.

Halo and Areoscreen, which one is the most efficient ?

Despite the controversy surrounding the halo in its early days, the FIA stood firm and eventually imposed it against all odds - notably purist spectators - arguing that the sport is evolving and that conservatism and tradition should not be preserved to the detriment of security. Which leads us to the following reflection: Why do the defenders of the halo readily agree to distort single-seaters in the name of safety but do not consider covering, for example, the wheels of these same single-seaters in the name of the same principle? 

They are very progressive when it comes to the halo, but conservative when it comes to the visibility of the single-seater wheels! The wheels on the outside have, however, often represented a danger in the event of an entanglement between cars, in collisions where the single-seaters climb over each other and fall into dangerous postures, or when the wheels become detached or suspension elements break and hit drivers, marshals or spectators. 

Prototypes and other closed racing vehicles are safer in this respect precisely because they have covered wheels. Even if it means making the single-seaters unrecognizable with the "Halo", we might as well go all the way by covering the wheels and suspension elements, if we take safety seriousely. This can only have a beneficial effect and save lives.

Verstappen and Hamilton close fight. Luckily, Lewis had his shield this day

  Many articles and videos have come out recently to demonstrate that the halo has not only saved several lives, but that it would have saved many more in the past if it had existed. Even if this demonstration is based only on speculations unfounded by irrefutable facts, we cannot deny that the halo or the aeroscreen in Indy still played a certain role and perhaps saved a few lives or careers, even if we will never know in what proportion. Statistically, the accidents of the past where the heads of the drivers were dangerously exposed and where they found themselves a few centimeters from the wheels, the guardrails, the ground, the walls or the fence posts, tend to demonstrate that the halo would not have make a big difference. Often the rollbar, in the case of rolling for example, played its role quite well, and luck did the rest in other situations. At least most of the time. And yet, during most of the history of racing, there was neither a HANS system nor side protections in the cockpits...

Derek Daly (airlines) at the 1980 Monaco GP. 

When luck was the main safety feature in such situations

There is no doubt that the effectiveness and probability of saving lives of this innovation will increase over time, but not to the extent that we are led to believe.

The same arguments could be made for covering the wheels on the outside. Except that no one is proposing it... let us recall in this regard the fatal accident of Marco Campos in F3000 in 1995. 

F3000 race in Magny cours. 

  An accident which eloquently demonstrates as much the danger of open cockpits as of uncovered single-seater wheels. The inconsistency of the federal authorities on this point, by caring about one aspect but not the other, is puzzling...

The latest CANAM cars, actually, Formula 5000 cars with covered wheels 

  If we can make an effort regarding the cockpits, why not do it for the wheels? Covering these is much less restrictive for the driver than imposing the halo after all. And for the spectator, it is enough to give him some time to adapt his eyes... Safety first, right? 

A reconverted Formula 1 Minardi 

Single-seaters with covered wheels were well known at one time in North America. The famous F5000 rebodied and renamed CANAM towards the end of the 70s and beginning of the 80s. Visually they were spectacular even if a little clumsy (but this was mainly because of their enormous air intakes and a poor old style "boxy" design). 

Even today, in club races in the USA, there are very beautiful single-seaters with covered wheels and the public seems to appreciate them. Visually, however, they remain spectacular.

A single seater or a prototype ? looks beautiful anyway. 

Origins of a tradition:

   It must be understood that this original aspect of single-seaters (outside wheels and open cockpit) is a heritage from the beginnings of automobile. 

 In the beginning the cars all had this appearance (driver and passengers uncovered and external wheels just like horse-drawn carriages), and it remained this way for several decades. The basic compartment or hood appeared shortly after to cover the passengers from bad weather and wind, and the wings above the wheels, supposed to protect them from splashes of water, stones or mud, were simple mudguards. These were therefore not structures forming an integral part of the bodywork.

An antic Alfa Romeo Grand Prix car at "Bureau de tabac" turn. Monaco

Moreover, when motor racing started shortly after the invention of the car, it is logical that the competitors, for reasons of practicality and lightness, only took on board the minimum. This philosophy of the pure radical racing car remained of course and was retained for the top racing series in particular, Formula 1, and by extension and pragmatic spirit also, for all the lower formulas. This is what made the single-seater as we know it.

This almost minimalist look of the single-seater is so rooted in automotive culture that modifying it by covering the cockpit for example or the wheels can only provoke a reaction of rejection from fans. Certainly, motor sports are inevitably destined to evolve, it is the very nature of the industry and the technology which are the basis of the automobile, but if it means daring to do so for one element (the cockpit), why stopping there?

  This leads us to question the true motivations of the most zealous legislators when they engage in selective securitarianism. In terms of zeal, the latter is generally only expressed after one or more serious incidents. In short, this zeal is mainly there to respond to an emotional reaction. It is clear to anyone who carefully observes the sequence of events that lead to such decisions that what motivates them are often political considerations, the fear of incurring criticism for inaction, and therefore of taking responsibility for them, legally and financialy, particularly on subjects as sensitive as drivers safety. Especially since when technically credible solutions to this problem are put forward publicly, it is difficult for the legislator to ignore them without solid counter-arguments.

 We must also not forget the financial aspect which comes into play. Having knowledge of the existence of these security measures, insurers for their part do not refrain from putting pressure on them, failing which they are no longer prepared to compensate in the event of an accident considering that the first parties concerned (organizers, teams, drivers) did not do everything that could reasonably be done to guarantee the safety of the drivers. 

 Without forgetting the interests of the manufacturers of these devices (when there are any, like the HANS system) or the inventors who own the patents and lobby at the federal level to impose their findings... The Aeroscreen has been skillfully suggested, taking advantage of a live transmission of an INDY race, by the company which already had it in its plans and which had experience in the field of fighter plane cockpits. In short, opportunism to open up a new market.

  These pragmatic and unaltruistic considerations explain the fact that paradoxically, this zeal is generally absent from more anonymous competitions, where this type of innovation only spreads after a long period. As in all areas of public life, media coverage and public opinion play a preponderant role in political decisions, which means that we see no or very few such radical reactions in matters of security in the lower less popular series, or in those which are publicized but without attracting a large audience, and even more so if they do not benefit from live transmission, such as rallies and hill climbs which remain to this day much more dangerous than races on circuit. 

 Serious accidents is those races make less headlines in the media, and the general public is not interested in them, apart from the minority of petrolheads who accept in advance the risks inherent to racing. This is what legitimately leaves the public, particularly purists, with a feeling of hypocrisy with regard to certain very advanced safety decisions in high-level motorsport.

 This double standard makes it appear that federal authorities value life in a discriminatory manner. This feeling is all the more obvious when we think of road safety problems which are treated with much less severity and urgency. Driving rules, the granting of driving licenses, passive safety above all and to a lesser extent the active safety of production cars and road infrastructure, do not benefit from the same exclusive attention. Which raises questions about the priorities of the FIA, the legislators and the manufacturers.

  Some legitimately believe that the emphasis on safety in elite motorsport is disproportionate to efforts to improve the safety of production vehicles. But that would be to forget that it is much easier to take care of the safety of a few dozen drivers for limited periods of time (limited time of competitions) than of hundreds of millions of vehicle users around the world. On the other hand, one could not reasonably expect that production cars would all be equipped with roll-bars or require passengers to wear helmets. Economically this would also not be viable, although with economies of scale it is always possible to reduce costs to some extent. There remains the feasibility and practical side of things.

Drivers safety the FIA way 😋

  On the other hand, we are entitled to wonder if so much energy and means invested in motorsport to maximize safety are justified, in addition to the additional costs borne by the participants (in the cases of generalization of these costly and restrictive measures to lower categories), ultimately resulting in a marginal safety gain.

 This leads us to raise the problem of adapting these security solutions to inferior formulas. We know that if they were planned for F1 or Indy for example, it is on the basis of extensive tests and data specific to these elite Formulas. 

 Take the HANS system as an example. Its development was based on the study of the forces exerted on the necks of drivers of very high performance vehicles. Knowing that this accessory has a prohibitive acquisition cost, imposing it on drivers in amateur races where the forces experienced are far from those for which the HANS was developed is unnecessarily costly. Even more so when it has to be replaced if it has been damaged in an accident to the point of making its reuse ineffective according to the standards set by the FIA. There is also the problem of homologation which require the regular renewal of this type of accessories and the cost that goes with it.

 This question is not always relevant, however. For example, we have seen terrible accidents occur in inferior racing formulas with very limited performance where more drastic measures would have had to approach those of F1 to hope to avoid serious consequences. We think, for example, of a certain accident where an F4 driver had his feet amputated following a head-on collision with another stationary car, exactly as was the case for Alex Zanardi who was driving in Indycar at a much higher speed on an oval.

 In short, it would be appropriate to study the relevance of these solutions for lower categories on a case-by-case basis. Their adoption should also not be an additional financial barrier to access to motorsport to the point of making it even more elitist than it already is.

 Warning ! "Motorsport can be dangerous" sign

   We must not forget that whatever we do, motorsport will always be a dangerous sport. It would be more relevant to put aside bad reasons when making safety choices, and to avoid excesses which are never good. Making sweeping decisions based on isolated incidents to appear to be taking action is not a good thing.

 It is important to find a balance between driver safety and the essence of motorsport. A more sincere, permanent and courageous reflection on the relevance of these measures and their overall impact is necessary to guarantee safety while preserving the beauty of the spectacle and the authenticity of the sport. On the other hand, tradition in motorsport is an important point to preserve, but we must not forget that it remains a subjective and relative point of view, and that the sport always ends up changing in a perceptible way or not. This said, those changes must not affect historic races at least...

  Finally and above all, we would still like to have the same uncompromising concern for the lives of road users even if economic considerations tend to make this objective difficult to achieve. Otherwise, in the long term, we risk a shift towards a situation where the gap between the importance given to a handful of racing stars and that given to a majority of racing drivers and road users would leave an impression of unjustified elitism. It should be remembered that the drivers have nevertheless chosen of their own free will a high-risk sport which only involves their own lives while the road user, especially when it's only a passenger, didn't make this choice...